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Abstract:  
Purpose: Since the literature on the effect of the unemployment rate as reflection of economic fluctuations 
on crime shows an empirically ambiguous effect, this study argues that a new way of modelling the 
dynamics of unemployment and crime by focusing on the transitory and persistent effect of unemployment 
on crime helps resolve this ambiguity.   
Design: Panel data for US states from 1965-2006 are examined using the Mundlak (1978) methodology to 
incorporate the dynamic interactions between crime and unemployment into the estimation. 
Findings: After decomposing the unemployment effect on crime into a transitory and persistent effect, 
evidence of a strong positive correlation between unemployment and almost all types of crime-rates is 
unearthed. This evidence is robust to endogeneity and the controlling for cross-panel correlation and 
indicators for state imprisonment. 
Originality:  The paper is the first to examine the dynamics of the interaction of crime and economic 
fluctuations using the temporary and persistent effects framework of Mundlak (1978).  In one set of 
estimates, one can evaluation both the short- and long-run effects of changes of unemployment on crime.  
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Economic Fluctuations and Crime:  
Temporary and Persistent Effects 
 
‘Nothing tends so much to corrupt mankind as dependency, while independency …increases 
honesty of the people. The establishment of commerce and manufactures, which brings about 
independency, is the best police for preventing crimes.’  
Adam Smith, 1763, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, edited by Edwin Cannan 
(1896). 
 
I.  Introduction 
On an intuitive level, one should expect a strong relationship between crime and economic 
fluctuation socio-economic status.  During a downturn, income decreases and poverty and 
unemployment rises leading to social exclusion and deprivation which induces stress and 
frustration. These make for a frayed social fabric that causes crime to increase.  In addition, a sharp 
change in income and wealth may provide an increasing motivation and growing set of 
opportunities criminal behavior.   
The above conjectures have provoked a substantial body of research starting early in the 
twentieth century (Bonger, 1916). Thomas (1927) provides evidence of a strong negative 
correlation between various types of crime rates and the business cycle, and her results were 
confirmed by Henry and Short (1954).  Since then there has been a very large literature on the 
crime-business cycle relationship, although much of the investigations within the discipline of 
economics into the relationship have often found that the positive link between unemployment and 
crime is weak at best and often there are results showing no effect of unemployment rates on crime.   
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The standard theoretical framework underpinning the crime – unemployment relationship 
in economics is founded on the work of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973, 1975).  In general, these  
approaches model the supply of criminal offences which is determined on two key factors.  The 
first involves the probability of getting caught and the severity of punishments if convicted of a 
crime.  If these increase, one would expect that individuals will be less likely to try to commit a 
crime.  The second issue is the person’s preferences toward criminal activity.  While difficult to 
measure directly, an important aspect of this factor is the alternative to crime – namely, labor 
market participation.  If employment and wages are generally high, the opportunity cost of 
participating in criminal activity is high.  Conversely, if there is substantial unemployment, the 
opportunity cost of spending time in criminal activity is low and should lead to higher crime rates.0F1  
Using this theory as base, a number of economists have attempted to determine empirically 
the relationship between crime and unemployment.  Early comprehensive literature reviews by 
Tarling (1982), Chiricos (1987), Freeman (1983) and Box (1987) highlight the conclusion that 
there appears to be only a moderate positive causal link between unemployment and crime.  This 
conclusion is further confirmed in later work by Freeman (1992, 1995, and 1999) who finds that 
the link between crime and unemployment is fragile at best.  In more recent work, Choe (2008), 
in investigating the effects of inequality on crime, generally finds no statistically significant effect 
of unemployment on crime rates using a US state-level dataset from 1995-2004 while the positive 
relationship between unemployment and crime is confirmed by Lin (2008). Gould et al. (2002) 
also report that both wages and unemployment are related to crime, but that wages play a larger 
role in the crime trends over the last few decades. 
Although the above review focuses on the research in the economic discipline of the link 
between crime and unemployment, discourse in criminology and other social sciences shows other 
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pathways though which unemployment can affect crime.  Candor and Land (1985) develop a 
theoretical model to propose that the aggregate unemployment rate may affect criminal activity by 
increasing levels of criminal motivation and by influencing the availability and vulnerability of 
criminal targets and, thus, the number of criminal opportunities.1F2  Furthermore, other 
criminologists focus on the psychological effects of social exclusion on forming individuals’ 
behaviors. Thus, Sampson and Laub (1993), Lemert (1967) and Farrington (1977) suggest that the 
strength of social bonds can explain participation in criminal activities and that people may become 
locked into a cycle of offending since if they are caught and punished are deliberately stigmatized 
by the criminal justice system.  Bourguignon (1998) shows that crime rates are positively 
correlated with income inequality and relative poverty.2F3  Furthermore, Rosenfeld and Fornango 
(2007) propose that consumer sentiment has significant effects on robbery and property crime rates 
and they find that it significantly affects the crime decline during the 1990s.   
In other research, criminality has been found by Sampson and Laub (1993) to be dependent 
upon social structure and social networks while Warr (2002) finds that influence of peers is also 
important.  Thus, the individual’s position in the structure of society influences his or her criminal 
behavior. However, all of these factors are influenced by unemployment since the strength of social 
bonds, the level of participation in society and positive self-image and social behavior of peers are 
determined, at least in part, by the level of deprivation, unemployment and social exclusion which 
are functions of both the duration and the severity of the economic downturns.    
Furthermore, the 2001 special issue of the Journal of Quantitative Criminology provides 
numerous important insights for the theoretical and empirical investigation of crime–
unemployment relationship, offering multiple explanations of the fragility of the crime 
unemployment relationship primarily by drawing attention to the statistical approaches which are 
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used in the literature. For example, Greenberg (2001) uses a cointegration approach to identify the 
long term relationship between crime and unemployment as reflected in the prevailing lag 
structure.  In contrast, Britt (2001) questions the overall suitability of this particular methodology 
used by Greenberg (2001). 
Later in the same issue of the journal, Levitt (2001) advocates using natural experiments 
and disaggregated panel estimation which highlights a common theme in the literature by using 
panel datasets to estimate the unemployment-crime relationship.  Doyle et al. (1999), Raphael and 
Winter-Ebmer (2001), Levitt (2004) and Mocan and Bali (2010) use state-level data to find 
unemployment effects on property crime rates (with moderate or no effects on other crime rates in 
the cases where they examine other types of crimes).  In similar line, Arvanities and DeFina (2006) 
find that economic downturns affect property crimes and robbery, and Phillips and Land (2012) 
find a strong and consistent pattern of unemployment on burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft 
crime via both opportunity and motivation effects . Interestingly, Andresen (2012) finds that 
motivation matters in the long run whereas opportunity (guardianship) matters in the short run. 
Using a quasi – experimental analysis, Bushway, Cook and Phillips (2012) using data over 13 
business cycles, investigate the effects of short term fluctuations of unemployment on crime 
establishing that an economic contraction causes an increase in burglary and robbery rates.   
Thus, this brief review of the literature suggests several key points.  The papers suggest 
that improving the wider socioeconomic context in which individuals live can reduce crime and 
decrease crime participation.  Hence, it is not only that the poverty or deprivation of individual 
families leads to crime but it is also the wider context of social stress and disorder caused by 
unemployment that dissolves the social fabric during the downturns which causes the increase in 
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criminality.  In this sense, economic prosperity ‘is the best police for preventing crimes’ (Smith, 
1793). 
Furthermore, the literature also suggests a careful econometric modelling of the 
relationship between crime and unemployment.  While much of the economics literature examines 
a contemporaneous relationship between crime and unemployment, criminology and other social 
sciences literatures suggest that other factors are important.  In particular, factors such as social 
exclusion and prolonged deprivation suggest that there may be long run effects that need to be 
investigated.  Even when time is recognized to be a factor (e.g. as in Andresen, 2012), it is useful 
for policy reasons to distinguish and model simultaneously both the transitory and persistent 
effects of unemployment on crime.  Thus, this paper proposes an econometric methodology that 
decomposes the unemployment effect on crime into a transitory and persistent effect highlighting 
the dynamic nature of this relationship for different types of crime namely violent crime, property, 
murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft and vehicle theft.  It shows that 
the standard way of investigating the relationship of using a fixed effects methodology to link 
crime rates and unemployment rates can be modified to generate the intuitive and theoretical 
effects between crime and the health of the economy.  
Using crime data for US states over a 40 year period, it is found that there is a strong 
positive relationship between unemployment and a wide range of different crimes.  In particular it 
is also shown that the persistent effect of unemployment rates has a particularly large impact on 
crime rates, highlighting that the factors that relate to long term unemployment are key policy 
issues to examine when looking to mitigate crime rates. 
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II. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In order to examine the issues discussed above, data on crime rates, unemployment rates, 
and other covariates are collected at the US state level from 1965 to 2006.  Several different 
categories of crime rates per 100,000 people from the Unified Crime Reports are used:3F4  violent 
crime, property crime, murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft, and 
vehicle theft.  Unemployment rates, the proportion of a state’s population that are in various age 
ranges, the proportions which are white, African-American, or Hispanic, the proportions with no 
high school, high school, or college degrees, the proportion of adults who are divorced and the 
proportion of single female headed households with minors are obtained from the US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics website (www.bls.gov) or from Flood et al. (2015).  A quadratic specification of 
time trends is also used in the regressions. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on crime rates.  The first column reports the average 
crime rates across all states and years.  The highest crime rates are property crime and larceny 
theft, and the lowest are rape and murder.  To see if there are differences by unemployment rates, 
the sample is disaggregated in two ways.  First, the sample is split by whether the unemployment 
rate of the specific year is below or above of the overall (unweighted) median unemployment rate 
for all states and years.  For each crime-rate type, the rate is higher when the unemployment rate 
is above the median, particularly for violent crime, murder, and robbery.   
Of course, states vary in their levels of unemployment through time in systematic ways.  
An alternative comparison is to examine whether there are differences in crime rates if a state’s 
unemployment rate is below or above the state’s average unemployment rate over the period 1965-
2006.  Using this comparison, the average crime rates are reported in the final two columns of 
Table 1.  The differences in crime rates between high and low unemployment rates time periods 
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are much smaller compared to the former comparison but generally confirm the previously 
described pattern.  When actual unemployment is above the average state unemployment rate, the 
crime rate is higher compared to the case where actual unemployment is below the average state 
unemployment rate for violent crime, murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and vehicle theft.  For 
the other crime-rate types, crime is (generally slightly) higher during low unemployment times. 
 
III. Methodology and Regression Results 
The above evidence relies on averages and ignores the effect of possible confounding 
factors, such as demographic makeup of the state and measures of the ‘social fabric’ of the state.  
In order to control such confounding factors a more rigorous analysis is required.  This section 
describes several different empirical methodologies to investigate whether unemployment is 
correlated with higher or lower crime rates, ceteris paribus.  Since this paper utilizes panel data, 
the estimating equation has the form: 
 jtjjtjtjtjt εsδIγUβXC ++++=  (1)  
where for state j and year t, C is (the log of) a crime-rate type, X is a vector of demographic controls 
for the age, race, educational characteristics of each state and a time trend, U is the unemployment 
rate approximating the fluctuation of economic fortunes, and I is per capita income in each state.  
The last two terms, s and ε, are unobserved components of the error term, although the former is 
specific to a state.   
 
A.  Basic Specification 
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The standard empirical specification with panel data is to assume that the unobserved state-
specific component of the error term has a fixed-effect relationship with the dependent variable.  
Thus, the estimation of equation (1) would imply estimating a set of state-level fixed effects.    
The coefficient on the unemployment rate and per capita income (divided by 1000) for 
each crime type are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.  Interestingly, after controlling for 
state fixed effects and clustering on the state level panels, most of the coefficients on the 
unemployment rate turn out to be negative.  This indicates that as unemployment rates increase, 
crime decreases for all crime types except aggravated assault.  However, in only a few instances 
is the coefficient on the unemployment rate statistically significant (property crime, robbery and 
burglary).  Likewise the per capita income results show a negative relationship, indicating that 
increased income is correlated with decreased crime rates. However, again, it is statistically 
significant for only a few crime measures – violent crime, property crime, robbery, burglary and 
vehicle theft.  Thus, these results are in line with the overall conclusion of Doyle et al. (1999), 
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Levitt (2004), and Mocan and Bali (2010who find similar 
results for the property crime-unemployment relationship.  Furthermore, Phillips and Land (2012), 
Andresen (2012), and Arvanities and DeFina (2006) find similar relationships for burglary and 
Andresen (2012) for robbery.  
 
B.  Transitory and Persistent Effects of Unemployment on Crime Rates 
While the fixed-effects methodology is a standard approach, it exhibits some important and 
well-known shortcomings.  First, it assumes that the state effect is fixed over time, possibly a 
strong assumption if there had been changes in crime policy at the state level over the time period.  
Second, any time invariant effect is subsumed into the fixed effect, making the fixed effect 
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economically uninterpretable as it is just the sum of any and all the state specific fixed effects.  
Although an alternative specification that addresses the shortcomings of the fixed effects estimator 
would be to model sj as a random effect, it has problems of its own, namely that it assumes that  
 E(sj|Xj, Uj, Ij)=0,  (2)  
which is unlikely to be the case.     
Mundlak (1978), however, offers a compromise between the two assumptions (also echoed 
by Greene, 2008, pp. 209-10) by specifying equation (2) as follows: 
 E�sj�Xj,Uj,Ij�=Xj�βm+Uj�γm (3)  
where the bar over the variable vector indicates the mean value of the variable for the state.  If one 
substitutes equation (3) into a random effects form of equation (1), the specification of equation 
(1) becomes:  
 Cjt=Xjtβ+Ujtγ+Ijtδ+Xj�βm+Uj�γm+εjt+(sj-E�sj�Xj,Uj,Ij�) 
or 
 Cjt=Xjtβ+Ujtγ+Ijtδ+Xj�βm+Uj�γm+εjt+𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗. (4)  
As Greene (2008) states, this retains the random effects specification but should also appropriately 
deal with the problem of any correlation between the unobserved effects (particularly sj) and the 
regressors.4F5 
The specification of equation (4) reveals some dynamics of the unemployment – crime 
relationship without having to specify a lag structure, a problematic issue as pointed out by 
Greenberg (2001).  Interestingly, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2002), using Monte Carlo simulations 
on the properties of the Mundlak (1978) specification, show that this specification can be viewed 
as an approximation of a general dynamic autoregressive distributed lag model.  Thus, they show 
that it provides an approximation of the temporary and persistent effects of the decomposed 
 10 
variables, when inference in a dynamic model is not feasible. They report that it is a representation 
of a model with lagged exogenous variables where the unspecified lag dynamics are fully 
compensated by the inclusion of the group means.5F6  Here to formally model this, equation (4) can 
be transformed to reveal the dynamics of the effects of the key variable of interest, the 
unemployment rate, on crime rates.  In this transformation, proposed by Van Praag et al. (2002), 
the terms mjj γUγU +  can be re-specified into )γ(γU)γU(U
m
jjjt ++− .  This allows an explicit 
decomposition of the effect of unemployment into two distinct effects.  Differences across states 
in the average unemployment rate proxy the persistent effect (estimated by the coefficient γ+γm) 
and the deviations from the average unemployment rate, )U(U jjt −  proxy temporary effects 
(estimated by the coefficient, γ).6 F7  Note that in this methodology, the relative importance of 
unemployment on crime rates regarding both a transitory and a persistent  effect can be assessed 
simultaneously in one equation.   
What is the economic intuition of this decomposition?  Holding per capita income constant, 
one might expect that the impact of a downturn approximated by an increase in the unemployment 
rate might be cumulative and the effects of a change in the economic fortunes on crime rates might 
be felt for many years after the event of the rise of the unemployment rate.  This could be the case 
regardless of the pathway that unemployment impacts crime.  For example, because 
unemployment insurance mitigates the drop in income for at least 26 weeks, long duration 
unemployment would exhaust these benefits, making the need for income greater.  Likewise, it 
may take time for the social fabric to fray, so temporary changes in unemployment may not have 
as much of an effect as a more persistent change in the unemployment rate.  The effect of an 
economic downturn on crime may take a long time to manifest itself, and, thus, one should not 
expect the only effect of unemployment on crime to be of the contemporaneous nature modeled 
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above.  It is important to note that this is also consistent with the criminology literature reviewed 
earlier which stresses the persistent deprivation and inequality effects on crime.  These should not 
be expected to be contemporaneous, but that they play out their impact on crime rates over the 
long term. 
Table 3 contains the results from this Mundlak specification.7F8  The results are somewhat 
different than in the fixed-effects results.  For the unemployment coefficients there are fewer 
estimated negative relationships for the transitory results (that is, the coefficient on the deviation 
from the state average unemployment rate).  Only the transitory effects of unemployment for 
property crimes and burglary remain negative and statistically significant.  Interestingly, the 
persistent effect of unemployment shows a positive relationship in nearly every case.  Specifically 
in each case where the coefficient is statistically significant, it is positive (e.g. violent crime, 
murder, robbery, aggravated assault and vehicle theft).  Finally, it is important to note that the 
relative size of the coefficients is much different, with a change in the persistent effect having a 
larger marginal impact on crime than a transitory change in unemployment effects.  The effects of 
income, as in the fixed effect estimations, continue to indicate a negative correlation where 
increased income is correlated with falling rates of crime.   
While the Mundlak specification attempts to bridge the fixed- and random-effects models, 
there are still potential problems with this methodology.  As Hausman and Taylor (1981) point 
out, one particular issue might be that the key variables may be correlated with the state-level 
random effect, uj.  If this is the case, then the results from the previous specifications would be 
biased because of endogeneity.  Fortunately, the Hausman and Taylor (HT) correction is very 
similar in specification to the Mundlak specification, and so the HT procedure can be used to test 
whether the results in Table 3 are robust to this type of endogeneity, assuming that the transitory 
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and persistent effects of unemployment and per capita income are the endogenous variables.8F9  To 
establish the exogeneity of the instruments used in the HT method, an overidentification test using 
a Sargan-Hansen statistic is implemented (Schaffer and Stillman, 2010).  The results of this test 
are given in column (4) of Table 4.  In every case, the test statistic is small enough where the 
exogeneity of the instruments is not rejected at the conventional five percent level.  Thus, the HT 
method is appropriately correcting for endogeneity. 
The first three columns of Table 4 contain the results from the HT procedure that assumes 
that the transitory and persistent effects of unemployment and income are endogenous.9F10  In 
general, the effect is the slight increase of the statistical significance of the transitory effect of 
unemployment in reducing some crime rates so that these results look similar to the results from 
the fixed-effects regression reported in Table 2.  From Table 3, the transitory unemployment 
variable is significant only for property , robbery and burglary crimes,.  However, when the  
persistent effects of unemployment on crime corrected for endogeneity, the coefficients are 
significant and positive for all types of crime except for violent crime and vehicle theft.  The 
important change is the increase in the size of the coefficient – making an already high marginal 
effect even more pronounced.10F11  As before, income is still generally negatively correlated with 
crime, with highly statistically significant coefficients – violent crime, property crime, rape, 
robbery, burglary and vehicle theft. 
 
C.  Robustness Check 1:  Controlling for Cross-panel Correlations 
One key assumption of fixed- and random-effects estimation procedures is that there 
should be no cross-sectional correlations in the data.  That is, in terms of equation (1), to obtain 
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efficient estimates, cov(εjt,εis)=0 for j≠i and t≠s.  If this condition is violated then, while the 
estimated coefficients will be unbiased the standard errors would not be correct.   
To examine this issue, two tests are conducted.  First, correlations in the errors (cov(εjt,εis)) 
across the 50 states and Washington, DC are estimated.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 contain 
the percentage of correlations that are significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively.  It is 
clear from this table, that the cross-sectional errors are often significantly correlated.  At the ten 
percent level of significance, at least 47 percent of the correlations are statistically significant (up 
to a high of nearly two-thirds of the correlations for robbery).  At the five percent level, at least 
40.2 percent of the correlations are statistically significant (up to a high of 60.5 percent for 
robbery).  These are very large numbers of significant correlations indicating cross-panel 
correlation.  Second, a more formal test of the presence of the cross panel correlations comes from 
Pesaran (2004) who proposes a parametric test of whether the cross panel independence of the 
data.11F12  In each case as shown in column (3), for all crime regressions, the z-statistic from the test 
has a p-value is less than 0.0001.  Given these statistics, it is likely that cross panel correlations 
need to be taken into account in the estimation procedure. 
The most direct way of correcting for the cross panel correlation is to use the Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) approach, which can be specified to control for cross-panel 
correlations.  Unfortunately, the use of this procedure is not without its problems.  On the one 
hand, Wooldridge (2002, p. 162) indicates that if there is cross-panel correlation, FGLS is more 
efficient than any other estimator that assumes no correlation (also echoed in Greene, 2000, p. 
470ff).  On the other hand, coefficient estimates from FGLS may not be the same as those obtained 
from OLS or fixed effects estimations because the calculation of the coefficients is weighted by 
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an estimated variance-covariance matrix.12F13 Thus correcting for the cross panel correlation can lead 
to better standard errors, but can generate differences in the coefficient estimates.13F14 
Table 6 contains the results from the estimated coefficients from this estimation. 
Interestingly controlling for these correlations explicitly suggests that not only are most of the 
persistent effects of unemployment positive on crime (except for property crime and larceny theft), 
but so are the transitory effects.  The effects of income are somewhat more mixed, as some 
correlations are positive (violent crime, murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault and vehicle 
theft) while others are negative (e.g. property crime, burglary and larceny theft).   
 
 D.  Robustness Check 2: Controlling for Imprisonment Effects 
The economics literature reviewed earlier suggests that crime rates are partially determined 
by the severity of punishment.  Although punishment may have an independent effect on crime 
rates, an issue of importance for this study is to examine whether punishment diminishes the effects 
of unemployment rate on crime.  Hence, it is useful to see if the results above are robust to 
including a measure of punishment.  Data on imprisonment rates by state and year from 1965 to 
2006 are utilized.  These rates are included in the regressions to attempt to control for these 
effects.14F15   
Table 7 below reports the results for two different specifications.15F16  For the first row in 
each crime-rate type, the standard Mundlak regression is reported, while for the second row, results 
from the FGLS estimation of the Mundlak method are reported.  In general, the inclusion of 
imprisonment rates does not impact the unemployment results in any significant manner.  For the 
Mundlak specification, the results are qualitatively the same as in Table 3 with generally the same 
variables being statistically significant in both sets of results with the addition of rape(for transitory 
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unemployment effects) and murder and aggravated assault (for income).  For the FGLS 
specification, the results are broadly the same as in Table 6.  Transitory unemployment is still 
estimated to have a positive impact on all crime types (except for larceny theft where it is now 
statistically insignificant). There is no qualitative difference for the effects of persistent 
unemployment – it continues to be positive and statistically significant in all cases except for 
property crime and larceny theft.  Finally, the income effect on crime is generally in line with 
previous results except for the coefficient for rape and aggravated assault is now negative (as in 
the standard Mundlak regressions).  In general, then, the results hold even after an indicator of 
crime deterrence is included.16F17  
 
IV.  Conclusions 
On an intuitive level, one should expect a strong relationship between crime and economic 
fluctuation in socio-economic status.  Downturns make for a frail social fabric susceptible to social 
stress and disorder that causes crime to increase, as well as diminishing the economic resources 
available to economically vulnerable people.  However, the literature on the effect of deteriorating 
economic fortunes as approximated by the unemployment rate on crime shows a weak relationship 
at best.  Using crime-rate data for US states from 1965-2006, standard fixed effects estimations 
show few statistically significant effects of unemployment on a variety of crime rates, and when 
the relationship is statistically significant, it is negative – implying that increases in unemployment 
rates decrease crime.   
However, it is shown that this standard specification is not the correct one.  Indeed, re-
specifying the empirical relationship does find a positive relationship between crime rates and 
unemployment.  By decomposing the unemployment effect on crime into a transitory and 
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persistent effect this study shows that, in particular, the persistent effect of an increase in 
unemployment is to increase all types of crime rates in contrast with previous studies which 
highlighted effects on some of the types of crime.  This finding is robust to a number of 
specifications – including controlling for endogeneity, cross-panel correlations, and crime 
deterrence. Thus, it appears that, as Adam Smith put it, economic prosperity ‘is the best police for 
preventing crimes’. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Crime Rate Type 
 
  Unemployment Comparison to 
  Overall Median  State Average  
 
Crime Type 
Overall 
Sample 
 
Below/Equal 
 
Above 
 
Below/Equal 
 
Above 
Violent 398.1 347.7 453.5 394.1 403.0 
Property 3770.1 3644.3 3908.3 3772.4 3767.4 
Murder 6.9 5.9 8.1 6.9 7.0 
Rape 27.8 26.3 29.4 27.9 27.6 
Robbery 130.7 110.1 153.3 127.6 134.5 
Aggravated Assault 233.3 205.4 263.9 232.0 234.8 
Burglary 962.1 910.3 1019.0 962.3 961.8 
Larceny Theft 2428.1 2391.1 2468.8 2434.0 2421.0 
Vehicle Theft 372.3 338.6 409.3 369.9 375.2 
Notes:  ‘Crime Types’ are rates per 100,000 people. 
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TABLE 2 
Selected Fixed Effects Regression Results 
 
Crime Type (log) Unemployment Rate Per Capita Income/1000 
 (1) (2) 
Violent -0.002 
(-0.53) 
-0.011* 
(-1.99) 
Property -0.004** 
(-2.36) 
-0.011** 
(-2.41) 
Murder -0.002 
(-0.85) 
-0.008 
(-1.45) 
Rape -0.005 
(-1.50) 
-0.011 
(-1.64) 
Robbery -0.006* 
(-1.88) 
-0.014** 
(-2.39) 
Aggravated Assault 0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.007 
(-1.17) 
Burglary -0.005* 
(-1.98) 
-0.011* 
(-1.94) 
Larceny Theft -0.006 
(-0.98) 
-0.008 
(-1.65) 
Vehicle Theft -0.004 
(-0.97) 
-0.011* 
(-1.80) 
Notes:  Other controls include: proportion of state adult population divorced, proportion 
of single female headed households with minor children, proportion of state population under 6 
years of age, proportion older than 64 years of age, proportion African-American, proportion 
Hispanic, proportion with no high school diploma, proportion with only a high school diploma, 
and a trend and its square. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by state.  *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
Selected Results from Mundlak Specification Results 
 
 Unemployment Rate Per Capita  
 Transitory Persistent Income/1000 
Crime Type (log) (1) (2) (3) 
Violent 0.001 
(0.188) 
0.133** 
(2.33) 
-0.011** 
(-1.97) 
Property -0.005*** 
(-2.98) 
0.019 
(0.54) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.39) 
Murder 0.001 
(0.32) 
0.169*** 
(3.65) 
-0.007 
(-0.88) 
Rape -0.004 
(-1.04) 
0.064 
(1.62) 
-0.011* 
(-1.65) 
Robbery -0.003 
(-0.93) 
0.188** 
(2.08) 
-0.013** 
(-2.18) 
Aggravated Assault 0.002 
(0.53) 
0.119** 
(2.22) 
-0.009 
(-1.38) 
Burglary -0.006** 
(-2.22) 
0.049 
(1.36) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.94) 
Larceny Theft -0.005 
(-0.89) 
-0.026 
(-0.82) 
-0.013 
(-1.62) 
Vehicle Theft -0.002 
(-0.53) 
0.102* 
(1.82) 
-0.012* 
(-1.87) 
Notes:  Other controls are the same as in Table 2.  Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics 
based on standard errors clustered by state.  *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical 
significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Hausman-Taylor Specification 
 
  
Unemployment 
 
Per Capita  
Sargan-Hansen 
OverID Test 
 
Crime Type (log) 
Transitory 
(1) 
Persistent 
(2) 
Income/1000 
(3) 
(p-value) 
(4) 
Violent -0.003 
(-0.78) 
1.346 
(1.64) 
-0.011** 
(-2.15) 
0.079 
(0.779) 
Property -0.007** 
(-2.22) 
0.284** 
(2.00) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.89) 
1.770 
(0.183) 
Murder -0.004 
(-0.88) 
1.000** 
(2.44) 
-0.011 
(-1.44) 
0.405 
(0.524) 
Rape -0.007 
(-1.47) 
0.406* 
(1.94) 
-0.015* 
(-1.94) 
0.065 
(0.798) 
Robbery -0.008* 
(-1.66) 
1.257** 
(2.38) 
-0.019** 
(-2.24) 
0.002 
(0.964) 
Aggravated Assault -0.002 
(-0.47) 
0.790** 
(2.25) 
-0.013 
(-1.62) 
0.008 
(0.927) 
Burglary -0.009** 
(-2.09) 
0.387** 
(2.15) 
-0.017** 
(-2.51) 
2.267 
(0.132) 
Larceny Theft -0.009 
(-1.24) 
0.259 
(1.26) 
-0.014 
(-1.15) 
0.135 
(0.714) 
Vehicle Theft -0.005 
(-1.22) 
0.541** 
(2.28) 
-0.014* 
(-1.94) 
1.339 
(0.247) 
Notes:  Other controls include those listed in Table 2 as well as state mean values for the 
other independent variables as instruments.  The endogenous variables in the equation are 
transitory and persistent unemployment, income, state divorce rate and state single female 
headed household rate.  Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by state.  *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance, respectively.   
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TABLE 5 
Percentages of Significant Correlations by Crime Type 
 
 
 
Crime Type 
 
ρ<0.10 
(1) 
 
<0.05 
(2) 
Pesaran Test 
(p-value) 
(3) 
Violent Crime 57.1% 50.5% 36.1 (<0.001) 
Property Crime 52.5 45.6 49.8 (<0.001) 
Murder 47.5 40.2 32.9 (<0.001) 
Rape 57.5 51.2 18.6 (<0.001) 
Robbery 66.2 60.5 42.7 (<0.001) 
Aggravated Assault 61.3 56.5  19.5 (<0.001) 
Burglary 59.6 52.2 66.4 (<0.001) 
Larceny Theft 48.3 42.0 43.0 (<0.001) 
Vehicle Theft 61.3 54.0 27.9 (<0.001) 
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TABLE 6 
Selected FGLS Results 
 
 Unemployment Per Capita  
 
Crime Type (log) 
Transitory 
(1) 
Persistent 
(2) 
Income/1000 
(3) 
Violent Crime 0.030*** 
(27.26) 
0.056*** 
(25.57) 
0.048*** 
(33.25) 
Property Crime 0.006*** 
(6.63) 
-0.009*** 
(-7.98) 
-0.010*** 
(-13.74) 
Murder 0.016*** 
(15.53) 
0.085*** 
(31.79) 
0.032*** 
(22.50) 
Rape 0.006*** 
(7.69) 
0.022*** 
(12.23) 
0.009*** 
(9.76) 
Robbery 0.060*** 
(32.25) 
0.087*** 
(24.56) 
0.107*** 
(44.55) 
Aggravated Assault 0.019*** 
(21.75) 
0.045*** 
(26.91) 
0.020*** 
(18.59) 
Burglary 0.004*** 
(5.51) 
0.019*** 
(14.77) 
-0.012*** 
(-15.04) 
Larceny Theft 0.002*** 
(2.65) 
-0.039*** 
(-38.41) 
-0.005*** 
(-6.74) 
Vehicle Theft 0.036*** 
(30.98) 
0.058*** 
(25.06) 
0.054*** 
(39.92) 
Notes:  Coefficients and standard errors (used to calculate the t-statistics which are in 
parentheses) are averaged across 500 randomized FGLS regressions where there are no more 
than 41 states in the regression. All FGLS regressions are estimated controlling for cross-panel 
correlation and heteroscedasticity.  Also controlled for, but not reported, are the list of 
regressors given in Table 3.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 7 
Unemployment Effects Including Imprisonment Rates 
 
  Unemployment Per Capita  Imprisonment 
Crime Type 
(log) 
 
Specification 
Transitory  
(1) 
Persistent 
(2) 
Income/1000 
(3) 
Rate 
(4) 
Violent Mundlak -0.0004 
(-0.12) 
0.116* 
(1.85) 
-0.018** 
(-2.55) 
-0.0002 
(-1.03) 
 FGLS 0.027*** 
(21.50) 
0.063*** 
(27.53) 
0.031*** 
(18.33) 
0.0007*** 
(22.87) 
Property Mundlak -0.006*** 
(-3.16) 
0.012 
(0.31) 
-0.020*** 
(-3.99) 
0.0002 
(0.79) 
 FGLS 0.003*** 
(4.58) 
-0.007*** 
(-5.95) 
-0.011*** 
(-13.47) 
0.0006*** 
(37.21) 
Murder Mundlak 0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.132*** 
(2.69) 
-0.018** 
(-2.15) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.04) 
 FGLS 0.016*** 
(14.20) 
0.083*** 
(30.59) 
0.021*** 
(12.75) 
0.0006*** 
(19.68) 
Rape Mundlak -0.007** 
(-2.32) 
0.040 
(0.88) 
-0.021*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.0010*** 
(-3.51) 
 FGLS 0.002** 
(2.61) 
0.016*** 
(8.29) 
-0.007*** 
(-6.21) 
-0.0001*** 
(-4.99) 
Robbery Mundlak -0.004 
(-1.21) 
0.183* 
(1.85) 
-0.019*** 
(-2.63) 
0.0001 
(0.24) 
 FGLS 0.060*** 
(28.81) 
0.116*** 
(31.29) 
0.116*** 
(40.32) 
0.0011*** 
(19.21) 
Agg assault Mundlak 0.001 
(0.33) 
0.098* 
(1.75) 
-0.016* 
(-1.89) 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
 FGLS 0.015*** 
(15.05) 
0.049*** 
(25.69) 
-0.006*** 
(-4.38) 
0.0010*** 
(35.89) 
Burglary Mundlak -0.007** 
(-2.37) 
0.053 
(1.32) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.0001 
(-0.18) 
 FGLS 0.003*** 
(3.953 
0.028*** 
(20.1699) 
-0.019*** 
(-19.46) 
0.0005*** 
(28.71) 
Larceny theft Mundlak -0.006 
(-0.93) 
-0.027 
(-0.82) 
-0.010 
(-1.17) 
0.0006* 
(1.68) 
 FGLS 0.0002 
(0.32) 
-0.036*** 
(-34.83) 
-0.005*** 
(-5.61) 
0.0008*** 
(46.33) 
Vehicle theft Mundlak -0.001 
(-0.11) 
0.096 
(1.60) 
-0.012 
(-1.48) 
0.0009** 
(2.56) 
 FGLS 0.036*** 
(28.54) 
0.069*** 
(28.59) 
0.056*** 
(33.60) 
0.0014*** 
(42.60) 
Notes:  Number in parentheses is the t-statistic.  Significance: *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, and 1 
percent significance.  Other variables controlled for are the same as Table 2. 
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Endnotes 
1 An interesting and recent extension of this work is Engelhardt et al. (2008) who employ an optimal search model 
to investigate the role of anti-crime and anti-unemployment public policy on crime by both the unemployed and 
employed. 
2 New research in economics by Coon (2015) supports this in the context of crime against illegal immigrants in the 
US. 
3 Chiu and Madden (1998) use a theoretical model to show that fixed penalties for incarceration lead to a link 
between inequality and burglary, particularly in poorer areas.   
4 These data originate from the FBI, although these particular data are found at the following website: 
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm. 
5 In the empirical specification below, not all of the elements of Xj�βm are retained.  This is because the Sargan-
Hansen overidentification test for the exogeneity of the instruments indicate that the best mix of variables are a 
subset of the demographic variables.  Specifically, in the Mundlak specification, the specification controls  for stage-
averaged variables of  the proportion of the population under five years of age, the proportion over 64, the 
proportion with no high school degree, and the proportion with only a high school degree. 
6 Notably there is no a-priori theory to guide researchers to the appropriate lag structure.  Ultimately, the focus of 
this study is not on the dynamics per se, but on highlighting that there are different transitory and persistent effects 
of changes in unemployment on crime rates. 
7 This methodology is similar to Friedman (1957) in the study of income and consumption and Gottschalk et al. 
(1994) in the context of decomposing transitory and permanent earnings. 
8 Interestingly, standard random-effects estimation without the Mundlak specification shows that the coefficients on 
the unemployment rate variable generally follows the pattern of results found with the fixed effects results in Table 
2.  This is consistent with the idea that while state fixed effects might be important in their own right, excluding 
them does not change the coefficients of interest in any appreciable way.  These results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
9 Specification tests also suggested that the percentage of adults who are divorced and the percentage of single 
female headed households with minors were also endogenous, and so these are also considered endogenous in our 
HT specification. 
10 Satisfying the overidentification test indicated that the independent variables should include all the time varying 
variables mentioned above, as well as time invariant, state averages of the proportion of the population under 5 years 
of age, over 64 years of age, with no high school degree, and with only a high school degree. 
11 That the size of the coefficient increases is not particularly surprising since this often happens using predicted 
regressors from a first stage regression.  The key issue here is that the effect is still positive and statistically 
significant. It is interesting to note that although the temporary effects of unemployment on crime are  important for 
some types of crime, in line with the literature mentioned above, the persistent effects are nearly always important 
and significant.   
12 The Pesaran (2004) method is used rather than the more standard Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier 
test because there are more cross-sections than years in the dataset.  The Stata command of ‘xtcsd’ is used to 
implement the Pesaran test. 
13 This is the sigma matrix found, for example, in Wooldridge (2002, p. 158, eq. 7.42)  
14 A further complication identified by Beck and Katz (1995) comes when the number of years is less than the 
number of panels, which can generate standard errors that are too small.  In order to address this, the following 
procedure is used:  a random number generator (based on a uniform distribution) is used to choose a subset of states 
(any number up to 42) to run a FGLS regression controlling for cross-panel correlations for each crime type.  This is 
done 500 times and the coefficient estimates are averaged over those 500 sets of regressions. 
15 The imprisonment data for 1965 to 1977 come from Langan et al. (1988).  The 1978 to 2006 data come from the 
US Bureau of Justice’s Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool at www.bjs.gov.  
16 Other variations are possible namely a dummy variable equal to one starting in 1976, the year the death penalty 
was legal in the US, a dummy variable equal to one starting in the year of the first execution for the state.  Including 
these variables as alternatives in the relevant regressions does not change the coefficient on the unemployment 
measure in any specification.  These results are available from the authors. 
17 Interestingly, the sign on imprisonment has different signs for different crime types suggesting that when it is 
positive, incarceration does not have the effect of reducing violent crimes. It is not clear why this is so, although it is 
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likely that there may be an endogeneity issue between crime and incarceration.  However, it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to investigate this further, although it is an issue that requires further research.  
 29 
                                                                                                                                                             
